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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAR DOCTOR, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. No. 17239 
ANTHONY BELMONT and 
GREGORY OLINYK, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action upon multiple causes of action for recovery 
of capital contribution to a partnership upon the basis that 
the partnership never came into existence; the counterclaim al-
leged breach of the partnership agreement resulting in prospective 
loss and continuing current loss from the operation of the busi-
ness which was ongoing at that time. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon trial before the court without a jury, judgment was 
entered in favor of plaintiff against the defendants for $25,000 
plus interest and costs and the counterclaim was dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the lower court's decision 
and a finding that a partnership existed at all times and award-
ing defendants-appellants damages in an amount equal to plain-
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tiff's participatory share in losses sustained in the operat;e 
of the business of the partnership. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January (R. 211, passim) or February (R. 105, lines 
11-29), of 1977, Car Doctor, Inc., through its officers, Gord' 
Giles and David Robinson, negotiated with Anthony Belmont anc 
1 
Gregory Olinyk regarding formation of a partnership to operat', 
a private liquor club and restaurant in Ogden, Utah. (R. 106, 
lines 5-30; R. 107; R. 175 and 176). On March 4, 1977, thep0 
ties entered into a preliminary agreement (Ex. 6-D) stating tc' 
I 
intent to form a partnership and setting forth conditions to 
i 
be met before the partnership would be effective, and grantinc
1 
Car Doctor the right to nullify and void the partnership agree-\ 
I 
in the event the conditions were not met. At the time of exec;! 
tion of 
capital 
the agreement, Car Doctor delivered a portion of i~ I 
contribution, $10, 000, waiving the requirement of escr:\. 
of funds provided by the preliminary agreement. (R. 115, lineol 
20- 26). On March 9, 1977, (Ex. 7-D and attachment to Ex. 3-fl 
the parties entered into the partnership agreement, and on Mar: 
11, 1977, Car Doctor paid the balance of its capital contribu-' 
tion, $15, 000, which was deposited to the account of The Winer 
(Ex. 4-P). Belmont's contribution for his twenty-five percen: 
chef ~t (25%) interest in the partnership was his expertise as 
club operator and a sublease of the business premises of T~ 
Winery. ( R. 107, lines 4-6; R. 176, lines 9-11; Ex. 7-D ml, I 
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Olinyk's contribution of $10,000 (Ex. 7-D, ~3) for a twenty five 
percent (25%) share, was made on or about July 6, 1977. (R. 213, 
lines 26-30; R. 214, lines 10-21). Prior to the grand opening of 
the private club on March 18, 1977, and thereafter, Robinson and 
Giles participated in initial operation of the business of The 
Winery, painting, remodeling, cleaning up, greeting customers, and 
the like. (R. 111, lines 6-24; R. 124, lines 10-30; R. 190, lines 
22-30). 
In early May, 1977, the parties to this action together with 
partners in Future Interests, Ltd., which owned the leasehold 
improvements utilized by The Winery in its business (R. 166) met 
for the purpose of discussing exercise of an option set forth in 
Paragraph 7A of the sublease agreement (Ex. 10-D) to purchase the 
leasehold improvements. (R. 132, lines 13-30). The following 
day, from his own funds, Belmont paid to Future Interests, Ltd., 
$10,000 (R. 164) to exercise the option to purchase (R. 166, lines 
13-30; Ex. 8-D ~l.(a)), and later, an additional $10,000. (R. 
184, line 23). 
After the meeting with Future Interests, Ltd., in May, Giles 
and Robinson "were trying to do anything to recover" their money 
(R. 153, lines 6 and 7); first negotiating for sale of their 
partnership interest (R. 193 and 194; Ex. 9-D) and thereafter 
simply denying the existence of the partnership. 
16-30; R. 153, lines 1-11). 
(R. 152, lines 
Operation of the business ceased in mid-August, 1977 (R. 182, 
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lines 24-28), having sustained a net operating loss of $ 36 ,-: 
(R. 148, lines 1-12), not including $20,000 paid by Belmont': 
his personal funds on behalf of the partnership to exercise:-
option to purchase the leasehold improvements ( R. 184, lines 
13-23) nor an additional $5, 463 paid by Belmont from persone: 
funds for business debt. (R. 184, lines 24-30; R. 185, linesj 
On June 23, 1977, this action was filed. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES CAME INTO 
BEING PURSUANT TO WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
Car Doctor relied upon the claim ( R. 3, ~8), and the Cc,:·, 
upon the finding (F.F. 7, R. 88) that certain conditions of tr'\ 
preliminary agreement had not been met and thus, pursuant to :I 
I 
agreement, Car Doctor had the right to void the written partn°· 
ship agreement and receive back its capital contribution. 
While Belmont was hampered in his ability to document 
actions demonstrating compliance with the conditions of the ::;:I 
4 agreement owing to the circumstances in which the partners~.:: 
business was terminated ( R. 56-57), his undisputed testimony. i 
duct of the business, and conduct of the parties demonstrates 
de facto compliance or waiver of compliance which, of course. 
parties had the right to do. 
-4-
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"It is fundamental that 
where parties have rights 
under an existing contract, 
they have exactly the same 
power to renegotiate terms or 
to waive such rights as they 
had to make the contract in 
the first place. 
*** 
"'It is a well established 
rule of law that parties to 
a written contract may modi-
fy, waive, or make new 
terms .... '" Chaney v. Rucker, 
14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 
(1963), quoting Davis v. 
Payne & Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 
1053, 348 P.2d 337 (1960). 
Referring to the agreement (Ex. 6-D): 
1. Car Doctor did not dispute compliance with the condition 
numbered 1. (R. 3, 118). 
2. As to condition number 2, the testimony of Lowell Stone, 
one of the trustees of Nottingham Mall Businessmen's Association, 
is clear that an agreement had in fact been executed for the 
management of The Winery by the performance of Belmont and the 
other partners. (R. 157-160). Robinson admitted that Belmont 
actually managed and operated The Winery during the period of the 
claimed partnership pursuant to agreement with Nottingham Mall 
Businessmen's Association (R. 127, lines 13-24). 
3. The third condition, evidence by Exhibit 10-D, admission 
of which was refused by the trial court, required a sublease of 
space and equipment from Nottingham Mall. Exhibit 10-D was re-
garded by Lowell Stone, a partner of Future Interests, Ltd., and a 
-5-
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trustee of Nottingham Mall Businessmen's Association, dba 1~ 
Winery, (R. 160, lines 12-24) and by Belmont (R. 178, lines;· 
I 
R. 179, lines 1-6), as the sublease and the authority under,.:.\ 
The Winery was operated by Belmont as a partner. 
4. The fourth condition does not require that a liquor 
license be issued in the name of Good Old Boys dba The Winer1.: 
the court implies (R. 204, lines 12-17; R. 230, lines 5-7), b1: 
simply that the Liquor Commission approve management and other 
contractual arrangements. Belmont explained ( R. 203, lines i:-· 
that the partners anticipated obtaining a new license wh~ ~ 
one in the name of Nottingham Mal 1 Businessmen's Association:: 
The Winery, Inc. , had expired, and further that all necessary 
approval of himself as manager of The Winery and the employees 
was obtained from the Liquor Commission. (R. 203, line30;H 
204, lines 1-11). 
5. While plaintiff claims that the fifth condition, ~ 
accounting of the funds contributed as of March 4 by Olin~~ 
not been made, Robinson testified (R. 108) that Olinyk told hr 
that the partnership needed money to begin renovation and payr; 
of rents and so forth, and that it was as a result of that urg' 
need that the $10,000 was not placed in escrow. (R. ll5, line 
20-26). According to the testimony of Stone (R. 165), Belmont 
(R. 180) and Olinyk (R. 219), the $10,000 was accounted for ir. 
ther 5 total of $9,600 delivered to secure the sublease and ano 
for drafting of the partnership agreement. Robinson tests c~ 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dulity by claiming (R. 141, lines 14--27) that while the initial 
money transactions were handled on a ''fairly informal basis" and 
that he was frequently at the business prior to its opening, he 
had no knowledge regarding application of the funds. 
Giles spoke the truth when he said (R. 153, lines 6 and 7) 
that, "we were trying to do anything to recover our money" when 
he and his partner Robinson relied upon the claim of non-perfor-
rnance of conditions precedent as a basis for disavowal of the 
Good Old Boys partnership. 
Point II 
THE PARTIES BY THEIR CONDUCT ARE ESTOPPED 
FROM DENYING EXISTENCE OF A PARTNERSHIP 
Nothing in the law of the State of Utah requires that an 
agreement to form or operate as a general partnership need be 
in writing. Wholly apart from any writings which the parties 
to this suit may have entered into, if, by their conduct, they 
have held themselves out as partners, as they did, then no refer-
ence to a written document, executory or executed, can relieve 
them from the obligations they have assumed. 
Robinson testified that he and Giles were involved in getting 
the business open, "painting and renovating, cleaning up the 
cellar and stuff like that" (R. 111, lines 8 and 9) and that his 
wife made the uniforms for the waitresses (R. 124, lines 28-30). 
After the business opened, according to Robinson's testimony (R. 
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111, lines 13-24), he and Giles acted as greeters at the door, 
"would also do certain chores or check on certain things, ask., 
how things were going, making comments or suggestions that it:.1 
felt were appropriate to the business." Giles stated (R. !Si, 
I 
lines 26-30; R. 152, lines 1-8) that persons managing other ti... 
nesses in which he was involved are treated differently from ..I 
manner in which he dealt with Belmont because "we are not 
partners ... they are employees," the clear inference being tha> I 
Belmont was regarded as a partner. I 
Robinson testified that he and Giles met, in May, with Lr j 
Stone and other partners of the Future Interests partnership 1:\ 
I 
132, lines 13-29) "to discuss the possibilities of exercising.·1 
purchase option." (R. 133, lines 1 and 2). Mr. Stone's recol· 
lection (R. 159, lines 7-11) was that "they were two gentlemen I 
I 
we met one evening after the club was operating. They represerl 
I 
themselves as Mr. Belmont and Mr. Olinyk's partners. And~~[ 
that they also owned or were partners in a business called the\ 
I 
Doctor." I 
William Buxton, an employee of The Winery, testified ili~ 
he had been "introduced to [Giles and Robinson] as part owners 
that he saw Robinson and Giles at The Winery when "things woui:, 
come up maybe once a week" and they would be "checking on thine:. 
talking to Mr. Belmont, that sort of thing"; that he saw them ( 
t h "sometime ! a T e Winery engaged in those activities as late as 
-8-
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around the end of May." (R. 223, passim). So clearly had it 
been impressed upon him that they were part owners of the business 
that he had no reservations about their simply walking into the 
kitchen of the business and removing food. (R. 224). 
Robinson's and Giles' assertion of ownership interest by 
exercise of domain over partnership property shows clearly in the 
testimony of Robinson that in addition to the food, he and Giles 
removed chairs and a cash register from the business premises. 
(R. 142, lines 26-30). While Robinson claims that that property 
was "borrowed," and claimed that he could only guess from whom the 
property was borrowed, he did admit that the "borrowed" property 
was never returned to The Winery. (R. 143). 
So completely had Robinson and Giles involved themselves in 
the operation of business of the partnership, that Belmont, who 
had principal authority and responsibility for operation of the 
business (R. 107, lines 4-6; R. 149, lines 6-16), excluded them 
from the restaurant. In explaining that exclusion, Belmont stated 
that he had "received some complaints from the employees as to who 
they were going to obey. My set of rules or what they came in and 
told them." (R. 191, lines 8-10). 
Robinson minimized the involvement, saying that, "Tony was 
awfully mad at us for interfering with turning down the lights or 
some such item" (R. 118), but complained that Belmont's reaction 
to his "comments or suggestions that we felt were appropriate to 
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the business ... was that we were meddling into the daily aper 
tions of the club and the restaurant." ( R. 111 , 1 ines 16-21j 
lines 26 and 27). 
The legislature of the State of Utah has mandated that: 
When a person by words spoken or 
written or by conduct represents 
himself, or consents to another's 
representing him, to anyone as a 
partner, in an existing part-
nership or with one or more per-
sons not actual partners, he is 
liable to any such person to whom 
such representation has been made 
who has on the faith of such repre-
sentation given credit to the 
actual or apparent partnership, 
and, if he has made such rep-
resentation or consented to its 
being made in a public manner, 
he is liable to such person, wheth-
er the representation has or has 
not been made or communicated to 
such person so giving credit by, 
or with the knowledge of, the ap-
parent partner making the rep-
resentation or consenting to its 
being made. 
(a) When a partnership liabil-
ity results, he is liable as if 
he were an actual member of the 
parntership." 48-1-13 U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended. 
The "person" in this matter "who has, on the faith of sue 
representation, given credit for the actual or apparent partnf'.· 
t de credi· ship" is Belmont, he having satisfied the debts of ra 
tors and others, who had 1 ikewise extended credit to the partr'I 
ship· No person testified that Robinson or Giles objected whe: 
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they were introduced to employees as "part owners," and, in fact, 
they themselves "represented themselves as Mr. Belmont and Mr. 
Olinyk' s partners." ( R. 159, lines 7-11) . No more "public 
manner" could be imagined by which a declaration of partnership 
could be made known to interested persons. 
No reliance need be placed on the testimony of the defen-
dants in this matter in concluding existence of a partnership; 
the plaintiff (essentially an incorporated partnership (R. 120, 
lines 1-10)) through its agents, has regaled the record with 
demonstrations of involvement with the business of the partner-
ship, as a partner. Thus, while the court might have found that 
pre-conditions had not been met and that the written partnership 
agreement was therefore void, it could not properly ignore 
the plaintiff's own testimony describing involvement in and 
conduct of a true partnership business. Whether the plaintiff 
was heedless or careless of the written agreement or whether it, 
through its agents, acquiesced in or condoned operation of the 
partnership without performance of pre-conditions was rendered 
immaterial by actual operation of the partnership. The truth is, 
that to such extent as necessary, the pre-conditions were so far 
performed as to effect the practical result which was the ac-
complished goal of the partnership--operation of a private club 
and restaurant. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plain facts are that the parties regarded and conduc·,' 
themselves as partners; that at some point the plaintiff-
respondent determined to do whatever was necessary to wi thdr2,, 
from the partnership because of operating losses; that plaintr' 
I 
respondent gave no indication of its intent until Belmont h~ f 
personally advanced $20, 000 (which, in any event, he was not 
required to do) to exercise an option on behalf of the part-
nership--resulting in a $20,000 loss which could have been 
avoided; that plaintiff-respondent seized upon conditions of; 
long ignored contract to escape pro rata liability for a $36,'\ 
operating loss. 
Neither law nor equity countenances such duplicity in bus:\ 
ness dealings, and this Court should condemn the bad faith con'.I 
of the plaintiff-respondent which was given sanction by the tr:l 
court. i 
DATED this 29th day of I 
) 
I{, 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this39th day of October, 1980, 
I mailed two (2) true copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS to the attorney for the plaintiff-respondent herein, 
Ellen Maycock, of Kruse, Landa, Zimmerman & Maycock, Attorneys 
at Law, 620 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, by mail-
ing said copies through the United States Mail, postage prepaid. 
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